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The source, timing, and geographical origin of the 1918–1920 pan-
demic influenza A virus have remained tenaciously obscure for
nearly a century, as have the reasons for its unusual severity among
young adults. Here, we reconstruct the origins of the pandemic virus
and the classic swine influenza and (postpandemic) seasonal H1N1
lineages using a host-specific molecular clock approach that is de-
monstrably more accurate than previous methods. Our results sug-
gest that the 1918 pandemic virus originated shortly before 1918
when a human H1 virus, which we infer emerged before ∼1907,
acquired avian N1 neuraminidase and internal protein genes. We
find that the resulting pandemic virus jumped directly to swine
but was likely displaced in humans by ∼1922 by a reassortant with
an antigenically distinct H1 HA. Hence, although the swine lineage
was a direct descendent of the pandemic virus, the post-1918 sea-
sonal H1N1 lineage evidently was not, at least for HA. These find-
ings help resolve several seemingly disparate observations from
20th century influenza epidemiology, seroarcheology, and immunol-
ogy. The phylogenetic results, combined with these other lines of
evidence, suggest that the highmortality in 1918 among adults aged
∼20 to ∼40 y may have been due primarily to their childhood expo-
sure to a doubly heterosubtypic putative H3N8 virus, which we es-
timate circulated from ∼1889–1900. All other age groups (except
immunologically naive infants) were likely partially protected by
childhood exposure to N1 and/or H1-related antigens. Similar pro-
cesses may underlie age-specific mortality differences between sea-
sonal H1N1 vs. H3N2 and human H5N1 vs. H7N9 infections.
phylogeny | cohort immunity | pathogenicity | virulence | reassortment
The influenza pandemic of 1918–1920 killed an estimated 50million people, most during a single wave late in 1918 (1, 2).
Its origin, epidemiology, and pathogenesis are still puzzling
(3, 4). Unusually for influenza A virus (IAV), which typically kills
primarily infants and the elderly, young adults aged about 20–40 y
suffered extensive mortality, which peaked in 25- to 29-y-olds
(1, 2). The same virus was comparatively mild in those only
slightly older or younger (Fig. 1). The very elderly, moreover,
suffered less influenza-related mortality during the pandemic
than in 1911–1917 (5). Notably, the virus was clinically un-
remarkable in >95% of patients (2), and almost all fatalities were
caused by secondary bacterial pneumonia (6, 7). Any explanation
must therefore account not just for the mortality peak in 20- to
40-y-olds but also for the mortality “troughs” in the very elderly
and in children ∼5–15 y of age (Fig. 1), as well as for the typical
postinfluenza complications (rather than acute viral pathogene-
sis) that killed most victims. The rapid reversion to more usual
IAV mortality patterns by the early 1920s must also be explained.
Current hypotheses of the origin of the 1918 H1N1 virus range
from an introduction of all eight genome segments from an avian
source shortly before 1918 (8) to reassortment involving pro-
genitor viruses supposedly circulating in humans and swine for
decades before 1918 (9). Here, by using a molecular clock model
that explicitly allows different evolutionary rates in different
hosts, which we recently demonstrated to be essential for accu-
rate inference of the timing and directionality of IAV host jumps
(10), we reconstruct the evolutionary origins of the 1918 pan-
demic H1N1 virus, the classic swine H1N1 influenza virus, and
the postpandemic seasonal H1N1 lineage. We then evaluate
numerous observations from epidemiology, seroarcheology, and
molecular evolution in light of these findings. Our results suggest
that the childhood exposure of various age cohorts to different
HA and neuraminidase (NA) subtypes was a key factor un-
derlying the age-specific patterns of fatality not only in 1918 but
also during other pandemics and seasonal influenza epidemics.
Results
Evidence That H1 Emerged in Humans Before ∼1907, Not in 1918.
Host-specific local clock (HSLC) analyses of H1 HA data reveal
two crucial points (Fig. 2 and SI Appendix, Fig. S1A). First, hu-
man H1 emerged from an avian source considerably earlier than
1918, sometime after the human + avian H1 most recent com-
mon ancestor (MRCA) at 1901 [95% credible interval (CI):
1895–1907] but before the MRCA of the pandemic and seasonal
H1 lineages at 1907 (1903–1910). Second, the classic swine in-
fluenza lineage is nested within the 1918 genetic diversity of
human H1, whereas the seasonal human H1 HA is distantly re-
lated to the pandemic HA. This pattern indicates that the swine
influenza lineage emerged directly from the human pandemic
virus but that postpandemic seasonal H1N1 did not. Rather,
there is strong phylogenetic evidence that it descended from a
distinct H1 lineage that shared a common ancestor with the 1918
pandemic HA in ∼1907 (i.e., both the seasonal and pandemic
HA genes were evidently drawn from >10 y of accumulated
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H1 HA genetic diversity circulating in the human population in
1918). This extensive diversity is consistent with the 6–12 y of
circulating seasonal H1 diversity seen in the 1930s, 1940s, and
1950s, but it is distinctly deeper than the just 1–2 y of circulating
HA diversity sampled in all later pandemic years [Fig. 2 (green
rectangles) and SI Appendix, Fig. S1B].
Additional analyses indicate that these inferences are robust
to the exclusion of potentially laboratory-adapted human and
swine strains from the 1930s and several short 1918 HA sequence
fragments (7) (SI Appendix, Fig. S2) and to the inclusion of human
H1N1 sequences only from 1918 to 1957 (before the reemergence
of H1N1 in 1977) (SI Appendix, Fig. S3). The results cannot be
explained as an artifact arising from an adaptive burst of amino
acid-changing substitutions in the rapidly evolving HA globular
head domain because an independent analysis of the conserved
stalk domain yields similar results (SI Appendix, Fig. S4) and there
is no evidence of episodic diversifying selection (SI Appendix, Fig.
S5). Accordingly, both third codon position sites (at which 97% of
substitutions are synonymous) and silent third position sites give
virtually identical timing and topology estimates as the full dataset
(SI Appendix, Fig. S6).
These results are consistent with an avian-to-human movement
of H1 in the first decade of the 20th century. This decade is an
interval during which a putative influenza pandemic occurred, in
∼1900 (11–13). It was retrospectively identified on the basis of
increased pneumonia and influenza mortality in North America,
England, Ireland, and elsewhere but is not universally considered a
bona fide pandemic. It was thought to have occasioned the emer-
gence of an H3 pandemic virus until subsequent reinterpretation of
H3 seroarcheological observations compellingly indicated H3’s
emergence during the 1889–1893 “Russian” influenza pandemic
(14). Analysis of uracil (U) content, which tends to increase after
avian IAV segments are transmitted to mammals (15), corrobo-
rates these phylogenetic results. Human N1 U content in the 1918
sequence is within the avian range (SI Appendix, Fig. S7), and there
are avian sequences with a virtually identical base composition to
the A/Brevig Mission/1/1918 NA at all four nucleotides (e.g., A/
duck/NZL/76/1984). Thus, seven of the eight segments of the 1918
human virus, encoding the polymerase proteins (PB2, PB1, PA);
the nucleocapsid protein (NP); the matrix proteins (M1/2); and the
nonstructural proteins (NS1/2) (10) as well as NA, exhibit avian-
like U content. The HA-encoding segment is the only one in the
genome of the 1918 virus with a U content significantly above the
avian distribution (P = 0.0003), consistent with it emerging in
humans earlier than the other segments (SI Appendix, Fig. S7). We
estimate this host jump would have had to occur by 1905 or earlier
to allow sufficient time to reach such a high U content by 1918.
HA Seroarcheology Corresponds to Phylogeny. Many findings from
seroarcheology and epidemiology, although overlooked in recent
years, also point to this earlier period, and not to 1918, for the in-
troduction of H1 into the human population (11, 13, 16–24) (Fig. 1
and SI Appendix, SI Text): (i) Seroarcheological results point to
an introduction of H1 between 1896 and 1907, not in 1918 (16–18,
21, 25) (note the peak in antibodies to seasonal H1 in those born
around 1904 in Fig. 1B, a pattern that seems inexplicable if H1
were new to humans in 1918); (ii) seroarcheology suggests the
disappearance of H3 not in 1918 but shortly after ∼1900 (11, 13,
18, 19) (Fig. 1B); and (iii) mortality patterns in 1968–1970 indicate
that the childhood exposure of those born after ∼1900 was to
a non-H3 virus, which offered no protection from the 1968 H3N2
virus (23, 24), whereas those born before 1900 enjoyed consider-
able protection from prior exposure to H3 antigens.
The prominent peaks in antibody titers against H3 and N8 in
those born in and around 1889 (Fig. 1) and the low mortality of
those aged >70 y in 1968–1970 provide compelling evidence that
the 1889–1893 pandemic was caused by an H3N8 virus (11, 13, 18,
26). It is widely assumed that the 1889 virus circulated until the
1918 pandemic. However, only about half of those born in 1893
were primed with H3 (14). Given the high attack rates of IAV (22),
this observation seems incompatible with an H3 virus circulating
until 1918 because it would require that half of 25-y-olds remained
immunologically naive to IAV in 1918. We therefore hypothesize
that the period around 1900, not 1918, occasioned the disappear-
ance of H3 and the reemergence of H1 in humans. However, such
seroepidemiological results can be difficult to interpret with high
precision, not least because particular viruses can greatly influence
the conclusions of such studies. For example, it is conceivable
(although we think unlikely) that an H3N8 virus circulated from
1889 right up until ∼1918 but that its HA underwent such extensive
antigenic drift after ∼1900 that antibodies against it fail to bind to
either 1968 human H3 or 1963 equine H3 HA antigens, which are
phylogenetically very divergent (10).
Interestingly, Kendal et al. (11) found that although H3 anti-
bodies were rare or absent in those born after 1900, N8 “persisted
in a virus prevalent from the early 1900s until 1916 or 1917” (also
Fig. 1A). Based on the intersection of the phylogenetic and
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Fig. 1. Mortality in 1918 and seroarcheological patterns. (A) Influenza and
pneumonia mortality (solid line) in different age groups in the United States in
1918 (data from ref. 1), and N8 neuraminidase inhibition titers (legend at right)
in sera from different age groups (data from ref. 11). Vertical bars indicate the
pandemics of 1830–1833, 1847–1850, 1889–1893, and 1918–1920. (Ages/birth
years are indicated below B). (B) Case-fatality ratios in 1918 (in black) (data from
ref. 1) and percentages of deaths by age from pandemic-related causes in
Ontario, Canada (in gray) (data from ref. 33). Also shown are percentages of
sera from different age groups with HA inhibition antibody titers (SI Appendix).
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Fig. 2. Maximum clade credibility (MCC) tree of the H1 subtype of HA. (Right)
Clade-specific rate distributions (in substitutions per site per year). (Left) Time
window of the pandemic of 1918–1920 is shown with a gray bar, as is that of
the putative pandemic around 1900. The posterior probability of each node
and the 95% CIs on node dates are shown. The orange star indicates the H1
variant that evidently gave rise to postpandemic seasonal H1N1 lineage in
humans. The widths of the green rectangles indicate the comparable extent
of H1 genetic diversity in 1918 and 1945 (more than 10 y in each case).
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seroarcheological evidence, we therefore propose that this N8
NA may have been carried over from a putative H3N8 virus that
circulated from 1889 until ∼1900 to an H1N8 virus that emerged
in the first decade of the 20th century. If so, prior IAV exposure
of the ∼1900–1918 cohort would have been to this putative
H1N8 virus. The seroarcheological data (Fig. 1B) suggest that
H1 had largely displaced H3 by about 1905. This idea is con-
sistent with the phylogenetic evidence (Fig. 2); the high U con-
tent of the 1918 HA (SI Appendix, Fig. S7); the lack of protection
of those born after ∼1900 to the 1968 H3 virus (23, 24); and, as
described below, the mortality patterns in 1918.
Origin and Emergence of the 1918 Virus. The time of the most re-
cent common ancestor (TMRCA) of H1 in humans, at 1907
(1904–1910) (Fig. 2), significantly predates the TMRCA of the
human and avian N1 lineages, at 1913 (1911–1916) (P = 0.008; SI
Appendix, Fig. S8). Hence, and this is a crucial point, there is
strong phylogenetic evidence that N1 was introduced from an
avian virus only after H1 was already established in humans. The
human H1 lineage also significantly predates the human + avian
TMRCA of PB1 at 1914 (1911–1916) (P = 0.006; SI Appendix,
Fig. S9), suggesting that PB1, too, was transmitted from an avian
host via reassortment with a human prepandemic H1 lineage.
The remaining internal genes also evidently arose from a West-
ern hemispheric lineage of avian influenza virus (10). Their
nearly identical phylogenetic patterns and their avian-like U
contents (10) suggest they may have been transmitted during the
same reassortment event as PB1. The most parsimonious sce-
nario is that a single event in ∼1915 (see below) brought together
a human H1 with the remaining seven avian segments, possibly
via an H7N1 virus.
If the avian segments had a single source, the human-avian
virus reassortment event must have occurred after ∼1914 but
before the TMRCA of the human and swine lineages of each
segment. To estimate these dates, we conducted an analysis of
each segment, including only human and swine H1N1 viruses,
allowing a separate rate for each host using the HSLC model. SI
Appendix, Fig. S10 shows that the root node TMRCAs for the
swine + human trees are remarkably consistent across seg-
ments: PB2, 1915 (1913–1917); PB1, 1915 (1913–1918); PA, 1914
(1912–1916); HA, 1914 (1912–1916); NP, 1914 (1910–1916); NA,
1914 (1911–1916); M1/2, 1914 (1909–1917); and NS1/2, 1915
(1911–1918) (full trees are shown in SI Appendix, Fig. S11). This
result suggests an emergence of the 1918 pandemic virus an-
cestor in ∼1915, with a window from 1913 to 1916 overlapping
among all eight 95% CIs and each segment. Thus, with the im-
portant exception of the preexisting human H1 HA, our con-
clusions support an avian origin of the virus shortly before 1918.
This conclusion suggests that its genesis was similar to that of the
pandemic viruses of 1957 and 1968, which emerged via reas-
sortment of avian and preexisting human viruses within human
hosts (26, 27), but with seven segments of avian origin acquired
compared with three in 1957 and two in 1968.
Classic Swine Influenza and Postpandemic H1N1. For every segment,
the human + swine root node date (or, in the case of HA, the
TMRCA of the swine and pandemic H1 lineage) significantly
postdates the TMRCA of the pandemic and seasonal human H1
lineages (SI Appendix, Fig. S10). A separate analysis of HA
excluding numerous 189-nt sequence fragments (7) similarly
reveals a strongly supported swine + 1918 (human) clade (pos-
terior probability = 1.0) dated at 1917 (1916–1918) (SI Appendix,
Fig. S2). In other words, the human H1 HA genetic diversity is
significantly older than the MRCA of the human and swine
lineages for all eight segments (SI Appendix, Fig. S10). These
observations suggest that swine H1N1 descended from the hu-
man virus, not vice versa. There is no evidence supporting the
hypothesis (9) that reassortment between decades-old human
and swine viruses played a role in the origin of the 1918 pan-
demic lineage. In addition, unlike the conclusions of Smith et al. (9),
these phylogenetic results agree with on-the-ground observations
in 1918 that the disease was new to swine and was caused by the
same agent as the concurrent human influenza pandemic (16,
28).
Unlike HA, the remaining segments of the seasonal H1N1
virus were evidently direct descendants of the pandemic virus (SI
Appendix, Fig. S10). This finding suggests that during the pan-
demic, reassortment occurred between the pandemic lineage and
a cocirculating, antigenically distinct H1 virus, creating the sea-
sonal H1N1 ancestor. This scenario parallels the emergence
of the 1946–1947 H1N1 lineage and the associated worldwide
vaccine failure (29). In both cases, rather than evolving directly
from its predecessor via antigenic drift, a new lineage with dis-
tinct antigenic properties evidently arose via the acquisition of an
“old” and rare homosubtypic H1 HA variant by intrasubtype
reassortment. The replacement of the pandemic HA by a heter-
ologous H1 HA offers a simple resolution to the long-standing
conundrum that antibodies to the swine/pandemic virus HA
suddenly disappeared in those born after ∼1922 (16, 17, 20, 30,
31), even though seasonal H1N1 obviously continued to circulate
(SI Appendix, SI Text). However, less parsimonious scenarios,
such as a separate cross-species introduction of the seasonal H1
HA from birds or even from other mammalian hosts such as
horses, in or shortly after 1918, cannot be formally excluded (SI
Appendix, SI Text and Fig. S12). Recovery of archival IAV
genomes from ∼1907–1917 and the 1920s might definitively re-
solve these questions.
Model to Explain the 1918 Mortality Patterns. Elderly individuals
may have been protected from the 1918 virus by childhood ex-
posure to an H1N1-like virus (5). We estimate that H1 and the
H2 + H5 lineage diverged from a common ancestor near the
time of the 1830 pandemic (SI Appendix, SI Text and Figs. S13
and S14). Moreover, protection was clearly greatest in those
born before 1834 (5) (Fig. 3A), implicating the 1830–1833 pan-
demic virus, which would have primed the majority of that age
group. If an H1-like virus emerged in 1830, it would likely have
been positioned near one of the orange stars close to the root of
the tree in SI Appendix, Fig. S13. Those primed as children be-
tween 1830 and 1889 by this HA lineage would likely have had
considerable protection against the 1918 HA, comparable to that
exhibited during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic by those born before
1957 (32), based on the similar genetic distances separating the
childhood and pandemic virus HA in each case (SI Appendix,
Figs. S13 and S14).
It is likely that the majority of those born worldwide shortly
before and during 1889–1893 were infected by the 1889 pan-
demic H3N8 virus (12). A progressively larger percentage of
those born either earlier or later, however, would have experi-
enced initial childhood exposure to the putative H1 viruses that
immediately preceded (1830–1889) or followed (∼1900–1918)
the 1889 virus. Based on observations of the 1893 cohort, about
half of whom were primed with H3 (14), we assume in Fig. 3B
that ∼0% of newborns, ∼50% of 7-y-olds, and ∼100% of 14-y-
olds would already have been exposed to prepandemic seasonal
strains in 1847, 1889, 1900, and 1918. Although these numbers
are undoubtedly inexact, we believe they are reasonable for de-
veloping a qualitative model as described below.
We propose that putative 1830–1847 H1N1, 1847–1889 H1N8,
1889–1900 H3N8, and 1900–1918 H1N8 IAV lineages de-
termined the childhood exposure patterns of the various age
groups alive in 1918 (Fig. 3B, Lower). In Fig. 3B (Upper), we
depict the protection expected against the 1918 H1N1 virus for
each birth-year cohort from 1830 to 1918 under this scenario. All
else being equal, the 1830 cohort (who were 88 y old in 1918)
would have had the best protection against the 1918 H1N1 virus
due to childhood exposure to a doubly homosubtypic virus. The
1847 cohort (71-y-olds) would have had intermediate protection
due to the presence of H1 HA antigens in their childhood virus,
but a heterosubtypic NA. The 1889 cohort (29-y-olds) would
have had the least protective immunity from childhood, almost
all having been primed with a heterosubtypic H3 HA and
Worobey et al. PNAS | June 3, 2014 | vol. 111 | no. 22 | 8109
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a heterosubtypic N8 NA. The 1900 cohort (18-y-olds) would have
had intermediate protection, having been exposed to a homo-
subtypic HA and heterosubtypic NA. Finally, most infants, with
the proportion increasing to ∼100% with declining age, would
have lacked protection because they would have had no prior
exposure whatsoever to IAV antigens.
The expected protection of the cohorts born in the years be-
tween the pandemics would follow the curve shown in Fig. 3B,
given the assumptions detailed above. Half of those aged 7 y in
1889, for example, would already have been primed by the 1847–
1889 virus before the 1889 pandemic; the remainder would have
been primed by the 1889–1900 virus, leaving the 1882 birth year
cohort (36-y-olds) with protection in 1918 midway between the
1847–1875 and 1889 birth-year cohorts (Fig. 3B).
The excess mortality patterns in 1918 (Fig. 3A) closely match
the expected protection curve based on this cohort immunity
model (Fig. 3B). Indeed, the actual peak in mortality among
young adults occurred precisely in those born from 1889 to 1893
(1) (25- to 29-y-olds; Fig. 1), the only age group in 1918 whose
childhood exposure would have been almost exclusively to a fully
heterosubtypic virus (H3N8) (also ref. 33). Note that the peak in
excess mortality in 1918 (Fig. 3A) closely overlaps the peaks in
both N8 and H3 antibody responses in birth years near 1889 (Fig.
1 A and B). In particular, the percentage of deaths due to pan-
demic influenza-related causes in various age groups in several
Canadian cities, from the most thorough analysis to date of
mortality data from 1918 (33), shows a striking congruence with
the presence of H3 antibody titers (Fig. 1B), one that is difficult
to dismiss as random coincidence.
Importantly, no single event, including the 1889 pandemic, can
explain the overall pattern. We propose that it was the aggregate
exposure of the various cohorts to different pandemic viruses,
and crucially also to the seasonal influenza lineages in inter-
pandemic periods, that set the stage for what unfolded in 1918.
This scenario provides a straightforward potential explanation
for the inflection points in the mortality-by-age curve in 1918,
including the observation that the most elderly cohort suffered
lower mortality in 1918 than in 1911–1917. The switch to H1N1
may have resulted in a virus to which their childhood exposure
provided better protection than it did to the putative H1N8
strain immediately preceding the pandemic. The same switch
would have had the opposite effect in young adults exposed in
childhood to H3N8, limiting the usefulness of their N8 NA-
directed antibody responses and leaving them with comparatively
ineffective antibody protection against both major antigenic
glycoproteins of the pandemic H1N1 virus. The age groups on
either side of the “H3N8” cohort would have enjoyed consider-
able protection against H1N1 due to their childhood exposure to
homosubtypic HA antigens (Fig. 3B), whereas the youngest
individuals lacked any prior exposure and associated protection
in 1918.
It is also possible that an absence of prior immunity to the new
avian M2 and NP proteins of the 1918 virus contributed to the
severity of the 1918 pandemic. M2 immunity is associated with
decreased viral replication in the lungs and less severe disease
(34), and preexisting immunity to NP decreases susceptibility to
secondary bacterial pneumococcal infection (35). The M2 and
NP proteins of the 1918 virus may have been considerably di-
vergent from the previous human variant, which likely predated
the homogenization of IAV internal genes after the selective
sweep in these genes that occurred in the late 1800s (10).
We can conceive of two mechanisms whereby the childhood
exposure of different age groups could have shaped the mortality
patterns in 1918. First, a mechanism akin to original antigenic sin
(OAS) (36) may have interfered with immune responses in some
of those infected in 1918 (33, 37), peaking in those exposed to
the 1889 virus. Although OAS has been traditionally considered
a within-subtype phenomenon (36, 38–40), it is plausible that
interactions between heterosubtypic viruses could also occur
(41). Indeed, Masurel (42) reported that when immunized with an
H3N2 vaccine, about 5% of individuals primed in childhood by
H1N1 yielded strong HA inhibition antibody responses to H1N1,
without any appearance of antibody responses to H3N2 virus. We
also speculate that exposure to H1 HA stalk antigens could have
resulted in unprotective (OAS-mediated) recall of antibodies to
H3 HA stalk epitopes in some H3N8-primed individuals. Such
misdirected immune responses could have had dire consequences
in 1918 for those initially infected by H3N8. Even if most or all 20-
to 40-y-olds in 1918 had already been exposed to the putative H1
virus circulating between ∼1900 and 1918, we speculate that their
initial exposure to an H3 virus might nevertheless have interfered
with their immune responses to the 1918 HA. This process, com-
bined with weak or nonexistent immunity to the newly emerging
NA, M2, and NP proteins in the 1918 virus, may have rendered this
subgroup at particularly high risk for severe disease and more
vulnerable than young adults in any pandemic since 1918. These
other pandemics have occurred against a backdrop of widespread
prior exposure of the human population to a homosubtypic NA
(1968, 2009) and/or HA (1977, 2009), or to a heterosubtypic but
phylogenetically closely related HA (SI Appendix, Fig. S13) with
a very similar HA stalk (1957) (33).
The alternative is that an unlucky subset of individuals had
been exposed only to heterosubtypic H3 HA antigens before
1918 (i.e., they had escaped infection by the putative H1N8 virus
that circulated from ∼1900–1918). Unlike virtually all older and
younger age cohorts (except infants), such an H1-naive subset of
20- to 40-y-olds would have been unable to benefit from anam-
nestic immune responses to H1 antigens. Importantly, immuno-
pathology is not invoked in this scenario: Heterosubtypic prior
infection would provide positive but limited protection, better than
being completely immunologically naive but worse than prior ex-
posure to N1 and/or H1 antigens. There is ample evidence from
animal models that this effect might be expected: Prior exposure to
a heterosubtypic influenza A virus (but not to influenza B virus) is
associated with lower death rates compared with completely naive
hosts (35, 43). However, it is also associated with higher viral lung
titers and enhanced pneumonia and death rates compared with
prior exposure to a homosubtypic virus. The observation that even
higher mortality than in 20- to 40-y-olds was observed in 1918 in
groups that were largely immunologically naive, young infants (Fig.
1B) and isolated populations (e.g., a staggering 22% mortality
in Samoa) (44), suggests that exposure to H3N8, although hardly
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Fig. 3. Excess mortality in 1918 and the childhood exposure/cohort immu-
nity model. (A) Age group-specific annual excess mortality due to pneu-
monia and influenza in 1918 (data from ref. 5). (Year of birth and age in
1918 are indicated below B.) (B) Expected cohort protection due to child-
hood exposure. Each segment of the 1918 H1N1 genome is shown in blue.
Putative H1- and N1-like genes in the 1830, 1847, and 1900 genomes are also
shown in blue, whereas putative heterosubtypic genes (H3 and N8) in the
1847, 1889, and 1900 viruses are shown in red. The human silhouettes are
colored by putative childhood exposure to HA and NA antigens matched or
mismatched to the 1918 H1N1 (+/+, blue; +/−, blue/red; −/−, red), whereas
the newborn is colored gray, indicating no prior exposure. The pandemics of
1847, 1889 (red), 1900, and 1918 are indicated with vertical bars.
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optimal, may nevertheless have been considerably better than no
prior IAV exposure at all.
It is important to note that unlike antigenic imprinting this
“H1-naive” hypothesis requires that a sizeable proportion of 20-
to 40-y-olds remained unexposed to H1 before 1918, although
most younger individuals (e.g., the excess mortality trough in
those ∼15 y of age in 1918) were exposed. Although this idea
might be unrealistic, we note that if an H1 virus indeed emerged
in the early 20th century, it was mild enough to go unnoticed at
the time (11–13); in addition, although seasonal influenza virus
attack rates peak at the age of 2–3 y and reach an average of
20.3% per year among children under 5 y of age, they are much
lower for adults of working age: just 6.6% on average, including
influenza B virus infections (45). Thus, it is plausible that a
quarter or more of the 20- to 40-y-olds alive in 1918 could have
remained unexposed even if an H1N8 virus had been circulating
seasonally for 10–15 y before 1918.
Discussion
We hypothesize that childhood exposure to an H3N8 virus may
have made some young adults in 1918 a sort of temporal coun-
terpart to highly vulnerable geographically isolated populations,
inducing suboptimal immunity that tilted the odds in favor of
secondary infection with the wide range of bacterial pathogens
that cause most influenza-related mortality. This small wedge of
the population may have had ineffective immunity not only to
some antigens that are currently targets for “universal” vaccines
(M2 and NP, newly emerged from avian influenza in 1918) but,
uniquely, also against both major antigenic glycoproteins and the
conserved HA stalk domain. Antibodies targeting the HA stalk
provide powerful protection against severe disease, but there is
little or no cross-protection between phylogenetically divergent
group 1 HA subtypes (e.g., H1 in 1918) and group 2 subtypes
(e.g., H3 in 1889) (46). If this model is correct, then current
medical interventions, especially antibiotics and vaccines against
several pneumonia-causing bacteria, could be expected to reduce
mortality dramatically if we were faced today with an otherwise
similar set of pandemic ingredients.
If childhood exposure of different age groups is indeed a key
predictor of outcome to a pandemic strain (i.e., if antigenic im-
printing and not just the intrinsic virulence of the virus shapes
mortality patterns), then current approaches to studying influenza
pathogenesis might need to be rethought. For instance, using im-
munologically naive animals to characterize the pathogenicity of
the reconstructed 1918 virus may be methodologically problematic,
because the pathogenesis of the actual pandemic virus appears to
have been profoundly affected by the prior immunity experienced
by different age cohorts, a potentially crucial factor not reflected in
such an experimental design. This idea could also help explain why
genomic analyses of large datasets, such as for the 2009 pandemic
H1N1 virus, have not yet identified “virulence factors” that can
explain why the virus causes a life-threatening infection in some
people but is asymptomatic in others. In short, it may be useful to
frame questions about pandemic IAV pathogenicity in terms of
how well (or poorly) prior exposure protects different age groups
from the >20% general mortality that can occur in “virgin soil”
populations (44, 47).
Finally, our findings suggest that childhood exposure of dif-
ferent age groups to distinct influenza virus variants may also
strongly influence age-related mortality patterns during seasonal
epidemics, as well as to H5N1 and H7N9 viruses. We hypothe-
size that the current severity of seasonal H3N2, which was re-
markably mild among the elderly cohort of 1968 (22) but now
kills ∼18-fold more patients aged >65 y than H1N1 (48, 49), may
be, in part, a consequence of antigenic imprinting rather than the
intrinsic virulence of the virus. The current elderly cohort (unlike
the elderly cohort in 1968, who had been primed in ∼1889–1900
by an H3 virus) was primed exclusively by H1N1 (SI Appendix, SI
Text). We predict that as the 1968 H3N2-primed cohort begins to
replace the H1N1- and H2N2-primed cohorts among those >65 y
of age, H3N2-dominated epidemics may diminish in frequency
and severity and H1N1-dominated epidemics may increase (as-
suming these subtypes are still cocirculating in future decades).
Prior exposure of some age cohorts to H7N9 and H5N1 clearly
cannot explain the age-specific mortality patterns seen with these
viruses, because they are not thought to have circulated pre-
viously in humans; all age groups have had prior exposure only
to heterosubtypic HA. However, childhood exposure to group 1
(H1, H2) vs. group 2 (H3) HA antigens, ones that are either
shared or not shared with the group 1 HA of H5N1 or the group
2 HA of H7N9, is remarkably predictive of disease severity: We
find that virtually all fatalities from H5N1 (group 1) have oc-
curred in younger patients initially exposed to H3N2 (group 2)
and, conversely, that almost all H7N9 (group 2) mortality has
occurred in older individuals initially infected by H1N1 or H2N2
(group 1). The opposing patterns of age-specific mortality/pro-
tection with H5N1 and H7N9 are highly statistically significant
and are almost perfect mirror images on either side of the group
1-to-group 2 HA transition that occurred with the emergence
of H3N2 in 1968 (SI Appendix, SI Text and Fig. S15). We hy-
pothesize that anamnestic recall of immune responses to the HA
stalk antigens of initial childhood exposure may underlie this
pattern by predisposing patients to severe disease when they en-
counter H5N1 or H7N9 viruses with group-mismatched HA but
strongly protecting them when these viruses have group-matched
HA proteins.
Immunization strategies that mimic the apparently powerful
lifetime protection afforded by initial childhood exposure might
dramatically reduce mortality due to both seasonal and novel
IAV strains. Better understanding of cohort immunity effects,
which may be more pervasive and powerful than previously ap-
preciated, might thus lead to improved understanding of IAV
pathogenesis and to better prediction, prevention, and control of
both seasonal and pandemic influenza.
Materials and Methods
IAV Sequence Data Preparation. We collected all IAV full-length sequences
fromhumans, birds, and pigs encoding the H1, H2, andH5 subtypes of HA and
the N1 subtype of NA. Identical sequences and apparent recombinants and
other problematic sequences were excluded. For each gene, a subset of
sequences of a size amenable to molecular clock analyses (∼300 sequences)
was sampled, preserving the most basal sequences in the major clades and
reducing the number of overrepresented recent sequences so that sampling
across different years was fairly even. Because the effective sampling time of
post-1977 to pre-2009 human H1N1 is 27 y earlier than the actual sampling
date, we shifted the dates accordingly (10). The full-length swine and human
IAV sequences from the alignments of the PB2, PB1, PA, NP, M1/2, and N1/2
genes from a study by Worobey et al. (10) were used for the analyses
summarized in SI Appendix, Figs. S9 and S10.
Phylogenetic Analyses. We analyzed these IAV alignments with the HSLC
model as described (10) using a Gaussian Markov random field Bayesian
skyride coalescent tree prior and a general time reversible + gamma sub-
stitution model. Each major host group was allowed its own rate in the HSLC
model. For the analysis of the H1, H2, and H5 subtypes, all of the avian
sequences were assumed to evolve at the same rate or were allowed in-
dependent rates, with similar results in each case (SI Appendix, Fig. S14); the
human H2 and human H1 clades were allowed their own rates. We ran
analyses for 50 million steps in most cases and used Tracer v1.5 to ensure
effective sample size values >200. We used TreeAnnotator to infer and
annotate MCC trees. To test the robustness of the deep, pre-1918 divergence
time of the human H1 lineage, as well as the clustering of the 1918
sequences with the classic swine influenza lineage rather than with the
postpandemic seasonal human H1N1 lineage, we conducted several ad-
ditional analyses of H1 datasets. These analyses included (i) exclusion of the
189-nt HA fragments from 1918, as well as laboratory strains of IAV from
both humans and swine from the 1930s; (ii) subsampling at most one se-
quence per host lineage per year; (iii) subsampling only sequences sampled
before the extinction of H1N1 in 1957; (iv) separate analysis of the HA stalk
domain (sites 1–150 and sites 921–1,698); and (v) analysis including only the
565 third-position sites and the subset of 503 silent third-position sites. [We
used MacClade v4.08a (50) to visualize all amino acids substitutions along
the MCC tree and then determined which were due to substitutions at the
third codon position by referring to the genetic code and the nucleotide
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alignment. One hundred thirteen of 4,107 third-position substitutions along
the MCC tree were nonsynonymous.]
U Content Analyses. We compared the U content of the 1918 HA and NA
sequences with the range observed in avian viruses (SI Appendix, Fig. S7). We
estimated an upper bound on when the 1918 HA sequence emerged in
a mammalian host using the approach described by Worobey et al. (10),
calculating how long a sequence starting at the average U content among
avian strains would take to increase to the U content value observed in the
1918 sequence, assuming the rate of U content increase in human H3 HA
(because it appears that the H1 lineage was approaching an asymptote
between 1918 and 1957). The overall H3 substitution rate (10) is slightly
higher than that of H1 (Fig. 2), so this assumption likely provides a conser-
vative estimate of the upper bound (i.e., if the rate of U content increase in
H1 were slightly lower than in H3, this discrepancy would suggest the entry
into humans was slightly earlier than our estimate of ∼1905). The upper and
lower range estimates were determined using the upper and lower 95%
confidence interval values for the avian U content distribution. A P value for
a test of the hypothesis that the avian-to-human jump predated 1918, based
on U content, was calculated as the proportion, out of 10,000 replicates, in
which the year drawn from the above-mentioned distribution was greater
than (i.e., postdated) 1918.
Tests for Adaptive Evolution. We used the random effects branch-site model
(51) for detecting episodic diversifying selection (EDS) in the H1 HA
phylogeny. We included representative sequences from each host lineage to
permit a search for evidence of EDS on the branch between each host, and
within each host after putative host jumps (SI Appendix, Fig. S5).
Tests of Whether Within-Human H1 HA Diversity Predates Between-Host
Diversity in Other Genes. A P value for a test of the hypothesis that the
within-human diversity of the H1 subtype of HA predates the human +
swine + avian N1 NA diversity was calculated by drawing a date from the
human H1 TMRCA posterior density and a date from the multihost N1
TMRCA posterior density, and then determining the proportion of 10,000
replicates for which the N1 date was earlier than the H1 date. The same
approach was used for tests of whether the within-human H1 diversity
predates the human + swine diversity within N1 and each of the internal
genes (SI Appendix, Fig. S10) and for a test of whether the within-human H1
diversity predates the human + swine + avian PB1 diversity (SI Appendix,
Fig. S9).
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